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Résumé / Abstract
Nous étudions la crise financière asiatique et en particulier le marché
coréen. Contrairement aux études précédentes, nous analysons le rôle des titres
dérivés durant la crise et en particulier les transactions par des investisseurs
étrangers. Nous démontrons l'impact négatif sur le marché causé par l'intervention
de ces investisseurs.
This paper is part of a larger research program pertaining to the role of
derivatives during financial crisis and also part of the research pertaining to the
causes of the Asian financial crisis. The Korean market is studied because of two
reasons: (1) it is a representative example of the Asian financial meltdown and (2)
there is a detailed data set available of all transactions by different types of
protagonists, including foreign investors. The paper begins with establishing first
the role of derivatives securities during the crisis. Once the role of futures
contracts is understood, the paper examines whether derivatives trading by either
domestic or non-resident investors, or both together, exerted a destabilizing
influence during the crash.
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The role of derivatives during nancial market meltdowns is still not well understood.
The Brady Report, written by a Presidential task force in the wake of the October 1987
stock market crash, blamed trading in stock index futures for the nancial crisis. Accord-
ing to the report, portfolio insurers tried to cover their equity exposure by 'mechanical,
price-insensitive selling' stock market index futures. Their actions drove down futures
prices and created arbitrage opportunities which led index arbitraguers to implement re-
verse cash-and-carry strategies, i.e. they bought futures and sold the underlying stocks.
The dynamic interaction between portfolio insurers and index arbitraguers was lethal
and caused a spiral downward tumbling of prices. The events of October 1987 were char-
acterized by the Brady Report as a vivid example of the dire consequences derivative
securities can have during a nancial crisis.
1
The Asian nancial crisis is certainly not a carbon copy of the October 1987 crash.
There are similarities and dierences which make a comparison interesting. The most
blatant dierence is the role played by foreign investors. Not surprisingly, several au-
thors, including Kim and Wei (1999), Park and Song (1999) and Radelet and Sachs
(1998), have put the blame for the Asian crisis on foreign investors. In particular,
Radelet and Sachs put nancial panic as the main cause of the Asian crisis. They ar-
gued that the sudden pull-out of foreign investments exacerbated the crisis by causing
a nancial panic combined with policy mistakes by Asian government and International
Monetary Fund. Along the same lines, Kim and Wei and Park and Song argue that the
nancial crisis in the East Asian countries, especially Korea, should in a large measure
be ascribed to the panic reaction and herd behavior of foreign investors rather than eco-
nomic fragility of those countries. Choe, Kho and Stulz (1999) refute the idea of market
de-stabilization by foreign investors. They take advantage of a unique data set covering
transactions by domestic and foreign investors on the Korean Stock Exchange (hence-
forth KSE). The KSE trading system is very similar to the Paris Bourse screen-driven
market, studied by Biais, Hillion and Spatt (1995). The pure order-driven market makes
identication of foreign and domestic traders easy, particularly since the former have to
register before they are allowed to trade. Like many other Asian markets, the KSE
experienced tumultuous times during the last quarter of 1997. With the widespread
contagion of the crisis across Southeast Asia, the outow of foreign funds started in
August and continued until the IMF bail-out in December 1997. As the crisis aected
the economy, the KSE experienced its most severe crash in its history.
2
Over a span of
four consecutive business days, from October 24 to October 28, the KOSPI 200 market
index, lost 20.72 % of its value.
3
The KSE crash is comparable to the Hong Kong stock
market crash from October 20 to October 23 when the Han-Seng index drop 23.34 %,
1
Much has been written about the Brady Report, both supportive and critical. For further details
see Kleidon and Whaley (1992), Blume, MacKinlay and Terker(1989), and Santoni (1988).
2
For an elaborate discussion of the Asian stock market crashes and economic fundamentals, see for
instance Corsette et al. (1998).
3
KOSPI stands for Korean Stock Price Index, the KOSPI 200 index represents the 200 most actively
traded stocks in Seoul, which take up about 80 % of the total market value.
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and the October 1987 NYSE crash with a one-day drop of 22.61 % of the Dow Jones
Industrial Average.
This paper examines two questions. First, what was the role of derivative securities
in the Korean stock market crash. Once the role of futures contracts is understood,
we examine whether derivatives trading by either domestic or foreign investors, or both
together, exerted a destabilizing inuence during the KSE October 1997 crash. Despite
the fact that futures and options markets are typically not as well developed in emerging
economies, Korea had very active futures trading. Established only two years prior to the
crisis, the market for the KOSPI 200 index futures contracts grew fast and established
itself quickly. Moreover, in the Korean case, futures contracts had the appealing feature
that foreign ownership restrictions were removed before the crisis.
4
Futures and options
on the KOSPI 200 market index are traded on the KSE. The data collected from the
electronic trading system enables us to investigate the pattern and impact of transactions
by domestic (institutions and individuals) and foreign investors. Hence, similar to the
equity trading study of Choe et al., we can identify the contracts bought and sold
by domestic institutional and individual investors as well as non-residents.
5
One may
wonder whether either foreign or domestic traders, like portfolio insurers during the 1987
crash, were net sellers of futures in a falling stock market with negative futures basis,
and caused the same downward spiral eect on prices experienced a decade earlier in the
U.S. and elsewhere. This paper is therefore part of a larger research program pertaining
to the role of derivatives during nancial crisis and also part of the research pertaining
to the causes of the Asian nancial crisis.
We begin by establishing the role of derivatives securities during the crisis. We fol-
low closely the approach of Kleidon and Whaley (1992), Blume, MacKinlay and Terker
(1989) and Santoni (1988), who examine futures trading during the October 1987 NYSE
crash. At this rst stage we do not make a distinction between domestic and foreign
traders. We show that the fraction of KOSPI 200 futures volume started to rise dra-
matically in July 1997, three months ahead of the crash, and died out after the crash.
Furthermore, we also report that selling pressures in the futures market during the crisis
were transmitted to the cash market causing a decline in cash prices, a pattern which
was not observed prior to the crisis. In particular, the rst main nding in the paper
is that futures trading was a contributing factor during the crisis. The basis, measured
as the dierence between the futures and cash prices, decreased dramatically and be-
came negative during the Korean crisis, like it did during the October 1987 NYSE crash.
Granger causality patterns between the cash and futures markets changed dramatically
4
To be more precise, foreign ownership restrictions were removed for futures and options in July
1997, i.e. three months before the crisis. More recently, namely in May 1998, they were also lifted for
equities. Choe, Kho and Stulz (1999) provide a detailed discussion of the restrictions which were in
place for non-resident equity holders.
5
We will use foreign investors and non-resident investors interchangeably. Strictly speaking, however,
there are foreigners who reside in Korea and have to register to trade.
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during the crash, namely there is unidirectional causality from futures to cash markets,
both in terms of returns and order imbalances. This, and other evidence reported in the
paper, leads us to conclude that trading in index futures played a signicant role during
the Korean stock market turbulence of 1997.
Having established the importance of derivatives trading, we turn next our attention
to the role by foreign investors and examine whether they acted dierently from domestic
institutional and individual traders. Choe, Kho and Stulz (1999) examine buy and
sell strategies of domestic and non-resident traders thoroughly and do not nd any
evidence supporting the idea that foreigners had a destabilizing eect during the crisis.
To make a direct comparison between equity and futures trading we reexamine equity
trading focusing exclusively on the 200 stocks of the KOSPI 200 index.
6
Many of the
arguments put forward by the opponents of nancial liberalization apply to equity as
well as derivatives trading. For instance, the argument that foreign investors act like a
herd applies to stock buy and sell strategies as well as the long and short positions in
futures contracts. We examine whether there is herding behavior among foreigners as
well as domestic institutional and individual investors in the futures market and compare
this with equity trading. Next, we investigate whether there is any feedback trading by
either type of investor and whether this destabilizing in nature. Finally, we study the
price impact of trading in the futures and equity markets by all types of investors during
and prior to the crisis.
When we examine the intra-daily patterns for each group of market participants we
nd that non-resident traders moved to the post-closing trading session of the equity
market, where trading occurs with less price uncertainty and price impact compared to
the regular trading hour sessions. Non-resident investors also increased their presence in
the futures market. In contrast, Korean individual traders increased their share across
all time intervals and across both cash and futures markets. Moreover, when we examine
herding measures we nd that during the KSE crisis the herding measures for equities
increase for Korean individual and institutional investors, compared to their pre-crash
levels, and decline for foreigners. Note that these results, obtained for the 200 KOSPI
stocks, dier from those of Choe, Kho and Stulz (1999), since they nd no evidence
showing that herding is more important during the crisis. For futures trading we nd
the opposite to equity trading, namely foreign traders increase dramatically their herd-
ing. It is also interesting to note that for equities the level of herding before the crisis is
roughly the same for Korean institutions and foreign investors (who are mostly institu-
tions). In the futures market the herding of non-resident traders is signicantly higher
compared to domestic investors, both before and during the crisis. We also nd that,
for the period January-September 1997, foreign investors are positive feedback traders
in both the cash and futures markets. During the same period, Korean institutions are
sellers of equity irrespective of the previous day's market return and positive feedback
6
Choe, Kho and Stulz (1999) considered a larger set of stocks, namely 414 of the 762 stocks listed
on the KSE at the end of November 1996.
3
traders in futures while Korean individuals are negative feedback traders in stocks and
sellers in futures regardless of the previous day's market return. During the KSE crash
era, foreign investors are sellers in the stock market regardless of the previous day's
market return and negative feedback traders in the futures market. Korean institutions,
as a group, remain sellers of stocks regardless of the previous day's return and become
negative feedback traders of futures. Korean individuals, as a group, also become nega-
tive feedback traders in the futures market while they become equity buyers irrespective
of the market condition. Our ndings dier from Kim and Wei (1999), who nd that
foreign institutional investors in Korea engage in positive feedback trading before, during
and after the crisis and herd signicantly more than their domestic counterpart. Kim
and Wei use monthly data, while we use daily transaction-based series.
Herding and feedback trading measures rely exclusively on the direction of trades. A
critical issue is also the price impact of trades. We therefore examine whether trades by
non-resident investors had a destabilizing impact on prices and market returns and
compare their trade impact with those of Korean individuals and institutions. We
compute temporary and permanent price impacts for equities and futures, using real-
time data. We nd that the temporary impacts of sell price setting trades of foreigners
slightly increase in equity markets and dramatically decrease in the futures markets but
neither movements appear statistically signicant. The evidence for permanent price
impacts is far dierent. Here the price impacts of foreign traders on the futures market
dramatically increase during the crisis. The permanent impact of futures sell price
setting trades by Korean institutions, also increases during the crisis but the increase is
far less dramatic.
The paper is organized as follows. In section I we examine the role of the futures
market during the KSE crisis. In section II we describe the trading mechanism of the
KSE in order to dissect and separate the inuence of foreign investors. We also describe
the nature of our data set and discuss stylized facts regarding trading in equities and
derivatives by foreigner investors. In section III we compare the trading patterns of
domestic and foreign investors. In section IV we analyze whether foreign and domestic
traders herd and whether they pursue positive feedback trading strategies. For domestic
market participants we make a distinction between institutional and individual traders.
The impact of foreign investors on prices and market returns in both the stock and
futures market is studied in Section V. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
I. Trading in futures and equities
We examine rst whether index futures trading was a contributing factor to the Korean
nancial crisis. In particular, we will investigate whether there existed similarities be-
tween the cash and futures market during the 1987 NYSE crash and the Korean crisis.
4
The 1987 crash has been extensively studied. It is therefore useful to draw comparisons
with this particular historical benchmark.
In addition to stocks, KOSPI 200 index futures and options are traded on the KSE.
The underlying asset for both the futures and options contracts is the KOSPI 200 index,
which is composed of the 200 most actively traded stocks on the KSE. At the time of the
crisis, the KOSPI 200 futures contracts were traded on a liquid market with signicant
daily volume and open interest, even though it was introduced two years earlier.
7
We
focus exclusively on futures contracts as trading in options on the KOSPI 200 index,
established in June 1997, was still in its infancy during the crisis roughly four months
later. The contract months for futures are March, June, September and December, and
the longest maturity period is one year. The last trading day of each contract is the
second Thursday of each expiration month. Figure 1 plots monthly averages of daily
volume for nearest month KOSPI 200 contracts in 1997 and S&P 500 futures contracts
in both 1987 and 1997 as a fraction of the trading volume of the underlying asset. Prior
to July 1997 the KOSPI 200 futures-to-cash market volume was comparable to levels
for the S&P500 futures and cash market during the 1987 crash year and 1997. After
July 1997 the monthly averages in Korean markets soared far above levels observed for
S&P 500 futures contracts. At the peak of the crisis the ratio exceeded 13 %, more than
double the typical level nd prior to the crisis (and levels applicable to S&P 500 futures
markets).
It will be useful to summarize rst some of the ndings regarding futures trading
during the 1987 NYSE crash. During the October 19 crash, the nearest month index
futures basis, i.e. the dierence between the futures and cash prices, fell dramatically
below zero and prior to the crash it was also frequently negative. The negative basis
is believed to be evidence of a disintegration between the cash and futures markets,
since the basis is normally positive as a result of the short term interest rate exceeding
the dividend yield on the underlying assets. The Brady Report argues that the nan-
cial panic observed during the crash is best explained by the so-called cascade theory.
According to the theory, the dynamic interaction between portfolio insurers and index
arbitraguers was repeated time after time causing a downward cascade in stock prices.
Proponents of the cascade theory argue that their theory is supported by the negative
basis during the crash. Many studies which attempted to explain the negative basis,
including Kleidon and Whaley (1989) and Santoni (1988), do not agree with the idea
that the negative basis itself supports the cascade theory. There are indeed several
competing explanations for the negative basis during the 1987 NYSE crash. Firstly,
Harris (1989) points to non-trading eects in the cash market as the main cause of the
negative basis. The cash prices are measured by an index, an average of prices of all
7
>From its incubation the trading volume of futures contract increased by 203.4 %. Comparable
gures for the Nikkei 225 futures contract are 0.49 % (from 1988 to 1990), for the S&P 500 futures
contract 106.96 % (from 1982 to 1984) and 191.82 % for the Han-Seng futures contract (from 1986 to
1988).
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the stocks included in the index, while the futures prices are real prices. The indexes
of cash market prices respond to new information more slowly than the futures prices
since the observed prices of non-traded stocks remain stale. Part of the large absolute
basis was therefore due to non-synchronous trading. Kleidon and Whaley (1989) nd
the cause of the negative basis in the physical order processing problem on the cash
market during the crash. They examine whether the S&P 500 cash indexes and futures
prices are serially correlated using data on 5 minute intra-day returns on October 19.
They nd that the S&P 500 cash indexes had strong serial correlation on October 19.
Meanwhile, individual stock returns and the S&P 500 futures prices are not serially cor-
related. They believe that if the cascade theory is correct, then serial correlation in both
the cash and futures price should be observed. Since they observe serial correlation only
in the cash indexes, they conclude that the primary cause of market de-linkage lies in the
cash market instead of the futures market. More specically, they blame the physical
order processing problems on the NYSE for the breakdown between markets. Finally,
Blume, MacKinlay and Terker (1989) argue that the main cause of the de-linkage be-
tween futures and cash market is market illiquidity in the face of extreme selling pressure
on stocks. They nd that on October 19 the prices of S&P 500 stocks decline 7.4 %
more than stocks not included in the index. By the morning of October 20, however,
the S&P 500 stocks recover nearly to the level of the non-S&P 500 stocks. The trading
volume of S&P 500 stocks exceed constantly the trading volume of non-S&P 500 stocks.
All these facts, they maintain, were evidence that on October 19, 1987 there was greater
selling pressure for index futures related stocks and the selling pressure drove prices
of those stocks down more than warranted. They suggest the extremely high level of
selling pressure on stocks might be associated with index arbitrage activities but do not
provided evidence for this. They also nd that there was a strong positive correlation
between the 15-minute return and the aggregated net buying and selling pressure for
S&P 500 stocks. The positive correlation between the S&P 500 stock returns and the
aggregated net buying and selling pressure might be consistent with the cascade theory
in which an order imbalance caused a price change and this price change in turn caused
further order imbalance, and so on.
During the Korean nancial crisis, we can also nd a de-linkage between the cash
and futures markets. The upper panel of Figure 2 plots both the daily KOSPI 200 index
and the prices of the nearest month KOSPI 200 futures contracts. The lower panel of
Figure 2 plots the basis dened as the dierences between the two prices shown in the
upper panel. We observe in Figure 2 that the basis falls below zero on October 20, 1997
and remains negative, with a few exceptions, throughout the rest of the crisis period.
In Figure 3 we compare the basis during the 1997 KSE crash with that of the 1987
NYSE crash. To facilitate the comparison, we compute the basis as a percentage of
the cash index, respectively the S&P 500 and KOSPI 200 index. While both market
crashes experience a negative basis, it is clear from Figure 3 there is a striking dierence
between the two cases: the de-linkage between the cash and futures market during the
6
1997 KSE crisis is less dramatic but more persistent than during the 1987 NYSE crash.
This dierence came from the fact that the market condence was restored quickly on
the NYSE, while the crisis lingered on in the KSE case.
One main feature of the cascade theory is that declines in cash and futures prices
are mutually perpetuating. This phenomenon is revealed in several ways. Firstly, price
changes in each market are positively correlated with their own past. Secondly, changes
in cash prices will be positively correlated with past changes in the price of futures
contracts and conversely, i.e., changes in futures price lead to changes in cash price and
vice versa. Finally, the above relationships should be observed only during the crash
but not at other times as the ecient market theory suggests that: (1) changes in the
price of futures contracts are not serially correlated even though intra-day cash prices
are correlated due to non-synchronous trading eects, and (2) changes in cash prices
do not lead to changes in futures prices while changes in futures price may lead to
changes in cash prices. We examine whether the cash and futures prices are serially
correlated, whether changes in futures prices lead to changes in cash prices and vice
versa, and whether the relationships that exist across the two markets are unique to the
crisis period. Firstly, we investigate whether current changes in cash or futures price are
related to their own past. Table 1 reports Box-Pierce tests for the daily the KOSPI 200
cash and nearest month futures prices. The autocorrelations are reported for lags 1, 2,
3, 6 and 12 as well as the corresponding portmanteau tests which are 
2
distributed with
the degrees of freedom equal to the number of lags. We divide the entire sample period
into four equal sub-periods. The rst three sub-periods belong to pre-crisis period while
the last is the crisis period. We can observed that none of the individual autocorrelations
for index and futures returns are signicant, while there is some evidence, based on the
Box-Pierce statistics, that the cash index return is serially correlated, though only in
the rst sub-period (January-March 1997). Futures returns are serially correlated only
during the crisis period (October-December 1997).
Next we examine whether the cash market leads the futures market and vice versa.
Table 2 reports Granger causality tests for the cash and futures returns and order imbal-
ances.
8
For the purpose of comparison, we divide again the entire sample period into four
equal sub-periods and apply pairwise Granger causality tests.
9
Before the crisis there
is no Granger causality, in neither direction, between futures returns and cash market
order imbalances, futures order imbalances and cash returns. During the crisis Granger
causality patterns changed dramatically. We observe unidirectional causal relationships
between returns from the futures market to the cash market. Furthermore, changes in
the futures order imbalances lead to changes in cash returns while changes in cash re-
turns did not cause changes in the futures order imbalances. These results indicate that
8
Details about the computations of the order imbalances will be provided later.
9
The lag length for the tests was chosen according to the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). Out
of several commonly used criteria for lag-length selection, AIC outperform the others in hypothesis
testing. See Thornton and Batten (1985) for more details.
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selling pressures from the futures market are transmitted to the cash market, causing a
decline in cash prices.
The results in this section clearly show that futures markets played a key role during
the KSE crisis period. We nd that futures prices were serially correlated and that there
existed unidirectional causality from futures to cash markets, both in terms of returns
and order imbalances. In addition, we also nd that these relationships are not observed
at other times, with the exception of the causation from the futures return to the cash
return during the second and third quarter of 1997.
II. The Market Structure and the Data
So far, we have shown the importance of futures trading without identifying the main
actors on the stage. In the remainder of the paper we try to identify who is responsible
for trading in stocks and futures prior to and during the crisis. We need to elaborate rst
on the market microstructure of the KSE to pursue further our analysis. This section is
entirely devoted to the description of the market and the data that is recorded.
The KSE is a pure order-driven market, like the Paris Bourse, where buy and sell
orders compete for the best prices. Liquidity is provided by limit and market orders
submitted by investors who buy and sell at the ask and bid prices set through previously
placed limit orders or market orders.
10
Both limit and market orders are continuously
fed into the Automated Trading System (ATS) which is a matching scheme satisfying
supply and demand according to price, time, customer and size priorities. In addition, a
call trading system is used at market opening and closing. Since all the security trading
on the KSE is fully computerized, transactions are executed promptly and are recorded
completely. The market microstructure of equity trading also applies to derivatives
trading, with the exception that only limit orders are allowed in the KSE futures and
options markets.
The trading hours of stocks in the KSE are divided into three sessions: the morning,
the afternoon and the post-closing session. The former is from 9:30 until 11:30 AM.
The afternoon session starts at 1 PM and ends at 3 PM whereas the post-closing session
10
More specically, the KSE is a pure order-driven market which has neither formal dealers nor
specialists. The NASDAQ and the NYSE are classied respectively as a quote-driven market and a
hybrid of order-driven and quote-driven market. The KSE and Tokyo Stock Exchange (hereafter TSE)
have no liquidity-provider of last resort. Moreover, the KSE has no exchange-designated agencies unlike
the NYSE or the TSE. On the NYSE, exchange-designated specialists have armative obligation to
provide continuous liquidity and to maintain a limit order book with the public's limit orders. The
TSE has exchange-designated intermediaries (saitori) who collect limit orders and match limit and
market orders but have no obligation of market making. For more details on the institutional structure
of the TSE, see Lehmann and Modest (1994) and Hamao and Hasbrouck (1993). The KSE market
microstructure is discussed in Choe, Kho and Stulz (1999).
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operates from 3:10 through 3:40 PM. The post-closing session has a special character
distinct from the morning and afternoon regular trading sessions. The post-closing
session only features equity trading and was introduced on November 25, 1996 to provide
investors with additional opportunities to trade stocks after the close and facilitate
trading block orders by institutional investors. This session also features limited price
discovery since the price of paired block orders can be negotiated within two ticks from
the closing price of the day. The trading hours of futures in the KSE are same with those
of stocks except two things: the afternoon session ends at 3:15 PM and there is no post-
closing session for futures. The KSE sets a daily price movement limit to cap excessive
price uctuations. Stock and futures prices cannot move in excess of a certain percentage
above or below the previous day's closing price. During the Korean nancial crisis period,
the limit was 8 %, 7 % respectively for stocks and futures. In our sample period, the KSE
was also open for trading on Saturdays but with shorter trading hours. For this reason
we excluded Saturdays from our sample. We can classify investors active on the KSE
into the following three groups: Korean individuals, Korean institutions and foreign
investors. Foreign investors are required to register with the Financial Supervisory
Commission. In 1997, there were a total of 6,514 foreign investors from 66 countries
registered, of which 4,514 (69.3 %) were institutional and the remaining 2,000 (30.7 %)
were individuals. Consequently, it will be more meaningful to compare foreign investors
with Korean institutional traders. Choe, Kho and Stulz (1999) discuss in detail the
Korean government restrictions which apply to both individual and aggregate foreign
investment in stocks and derivatives. According to the restrictions, stock holdings cannot
exceed a certain percentage of the total outstanding shares of each company and cannot
exceed the average daily open interest for the last three months for futures. In July 1997,
right before the crisis, the aggregate ceiling for the derivatives was removed, even though
the individual ceiling was not changed. Individual contract restrictions remained in place
until May 1998 when all types of ownership restrictions were completely removed. The
relaxing of restrictions on holding derivatives obviously provided extra incentives for
foreign investors to trade futures and options instead of stocks during the Korean crisis.
In Table 3 we report the percentage upper bounds on aggregate and individual foreign
ownerships. While these restrictions were gradually removed after the Asian nancial
crisis, we note from Table 3 that throughout the crisis, the aggregate ceiling for equities
ranged from 20 % to 26 % and from 5 % to 7 % for individual foreign investor ownership.
For our analysis we use real-time data of trades in all stocks comprised in the KOSPI
200 and the KOSPI 200 index futures contracts from January 3 to December 26, 1997,
a sample period which brackets the crash from October 24 to October 27, 1997. Each
record in our data set provides detailed information on orders and transactions: the
time stamp, size and type of each order, bid or oer price, the country of residence
and type of buyers and sellers. Henceforth, we will divide the entire sample period into
two sub-period: before the crisis (January-September 1997) and during the crisis period
(October-December 1997). The source of our data is the same as Choe et al. (1999)
9
who provide specic details we omit here. However, as noted before, we do not examine
all the stocks used by Choe, Kho and Stulz. Instead, we synchronize equity trading
with futures and therefore focus exclusively on the 200 stocks in the index. In addition,
we aggregate all activity in stocks and characterize it as equity trading. Moreover, for
futures we consider only the nearest month contract at any time, since it has the most
liquidity.
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III. Domestic and Foreign Trading Patterns
Korean individuals take respectively a 65 % and 25 % share in KOSPI 200 equities
and futures volume prior to the crisis. During the crisis period, their share in equities
and futures trading volume increases to 68 % and 50 % respectively. Korea did not
have a well developed nancial services sector. In particular, hardly any contract-type
mutual funds existed which explains why Korean individual investors took the lion's
share of equity trading volume. Figure 4 shows the share of the trading volume of
foreign investors relative to total buy and sell volume in the cash (KOSPI 200 stocks)
and futures markets. For the 200 equities, volume by foreign investors takes up roughly
a 10 % share of total volume. Right before the crisis, i.e. in September 1997, their share
in sell volume soars to 22 %, while their share in buy volume increased slightly. During
the rst two months of the crisis period, October and November 1997, the fraction of sell
volume initiated by non-resident market participants remains high while the fraction of
their buy volume continues to decrease. In contrast, from the lower panel in Figure 4
we note that there is a steady increase of the futures sell and buy volume attributed to
non-resident traders during the same period.
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In Figure 5 we plot the monthly averages during 1997 of net buy volume for all
KOSPI 200 stocks and for the nearest month KOSPI 200 futures contracts. The top
panel covers equity trading, the lower panel covers futures. Each panel displays the three
categories of traders, domestic institutions/ individuals and foreign investors. Positive
values indicate net buy volume, whereas negative values reect net sell volume. During
October 1997, when the KSE suered its severest market crash, both foreign investors
and Korean institutions were net sellers for both equities and futures. The cash and
futures market curves of foreign net trading volume show a steady downward trend until
October, meaning ever increasing net selling. This trend dramatically reverses in both
markets after October 1997. During the crisis the net selling volume of foreign investors
was greater than that of Korean institutions. Meanwhile, Korean individuals were net
11
The nearest term contract changes maturity at the end of the rst week of the expiration months,
namely March, June, September and December.
12
We exclude December 1997 from this consideration since a new March 1998 contract was introduced
on December 8, 1997. The share of buy volume, in particular, appears to have a cycle which is associated
with the roll-over eect of nearest month futures contracts.
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buyers. In the equity markets there is a clear upward trend starting mid-year and
climbing almost without interruption until December 1997. In the futures market the
picture is more dramatic, as shown in the lower Panel of Figure 5. There is essentially a
spike in October 1997, namely the net selling by foreign investors and Korean institutions
are exactly oset by a huge surge of net buying of Korean individuals.
The combination of the evidence in Figures 4 and 5 clearly reveals that net selling by
non-resident investors on both markets starts to increase several months before the crisis
and keeps increasing until October 1997, when the KSE experienced its severest market
crash. The fact that the share of foreign sell volume was increased and foreign investors
were net sellers of equities and futures during the crisis period reminds us of portfolio
insurers during the October 1987 crash who were believed to initiate, in conjunction
with index arbitrageurs, the vicious cycle of price declines. However, we can draw any
rm conclusion at this stage, since we only examine monthly averages which reveal a
very partial aggregate picture.
We turn our attention now to intra-day trading patterns. In particular, we examine
whether the intra-daily trading patterns for each group of market participants have
changed during the crisis. We divide a typical day of trading in stocks into eight relatively
homogeneous time slots. We will denote by TS1 the morning-session opening batch
auction, whereas TS2 (9:30-10:30) and TS3 (10:30-11:30) cover the morning-session
continuous trading periods. Similarly, we denote by TS4 the afternoon-session opening
batch auction, while TS5 (13:00-14:00) and TS6 (14:00-14:50) are the afternoon-session
continuous trading time slots. Finally, TS7 is the closing batch auction and TS8 (15:10-
15:40) is the post-closing trading session. Since there is no post-closing trading session
in the futures market, we have samples for TS1 through TS7. TS6 for futures is from
14:00 to 15:05 since the futures market closes at 15:15 and there are no trades during the
last 10 minutes before the closing batch auction. Table 4 reports descriptive statistics
of the intra-day share of trading volume for each type of market participant. Table 4
also reports the t-test statistics for the dierences in means of the shares before and
during the crisis. Figures 6 and 7 show for each class of traders the intra-day volume
share averaged before and during the crisis period, for all stocks in the index and for the
nearest month index futures contracts. Table 4 Panel A and Figure 6 show that there are
important dierences before and during the crisis, between the intra-day trading pattern
for equities. From Figure 6 we note that the share of Korean individuals increases for
all the continuous trading time slots, i.e. TS2, TS3, TS5 and TS6, while their share in
the post-closing session decreased. The statistics reported in Panel A of Table 4 conrm
that the increases are also statistically signicant. Some of the increases are also large in
economic terms. The mean of the volume share of resident individual traders increases
from 68.1 % to 76.6 % and from 65.6 % to 73.3 %, respectively during the two morning
TS2 and TS3 sessions. The median changes are similar. In the afternoon continuous
trading sessions the increases are not so dramatic, though they remain statistically
signicant. Meanwhile, the share of Korean institutions decreased for all time slots
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except the post-closing trading session. The decreases reported in Panel A of Table 4
are again economically very signicant. In the morning continuous trading sessions the
mean shares are almost cut in half, dropping for instance from 21.6 % to 13.5 % in TS2.
Again, during the afternoon the drops are less dramatic in absolute terms, though still
statistically signicant. The median decreases are of the same magnitude as the means,
which indicates a fairly symmetrical shaped distribution of volume share. The last set
of statistics reported in Table 4, Panel A, conrm the results in Figure 6, namely that
during the crisis period, the share of foreign investors increased only in the closing batch
auction and post-closing trading session where trading occurs with less price uncertainty
and price impact compared to the regular trading hour sessions. Particularly, in the TS8
session there is a dramatic increase, the mean share almost doubles from 15.3 % to 28.1
%. For the median the ratio triples from 6.9 % before the crisis to 28.1 % which is
almost a third of the trading volume.
Table 4 Panel B and Figure 7 show that for futures markets, there are also important
dierences between intra-day trading patterns before and during the crisis. The share
of Korean individuals increased across all time slots. The increases are again dramatic,
the mean and median shares basically double from 25 % to 50 % throughout the entire
day. The largest relative and obsolete decreases in mean and median shares are observed
for Korean institutions. Before the crisis Korean institutions are the dominant players
in terms of volume in futures contracts. This leading role was overtaken by Korean
individuals with about half of the volume throughout the day. The share of foreign
investors also increased for all continuous trading periods, i.e. TS2, TS3, TS5 and
TS6.
The results in Figures 6 and 7 and Table 4 clearly indicate that non-resident traders
moved to the post-closing session of the equity market and, as was shown in Figure 4
as well as Table 4, increased their presence in the futures market. Korean individual
traders increased their share across all time intervals and across both cash and futures
markets. The spike in net buying, shown in the lower panel of Figure 5 and the statistics
in Table 4, revealed that Korean individual traders also ranked rst in share of volume in
the futures market during the crisis, a position which was taken by Korean institutions
before the crisis. Since non-resident traders are mostly institutions, it is interesting to
note the dierences in the response of institutions, non-resident and domestic, during
the KSE nancial crisis. Domestic institutions basically reduced their presence on the
futures market. Foreign investors and Korean individuals did precisely the opposite.
IV. Herding and Feedback Trading
The behavior of U.S. institutional investors features positive feedback trading and herd-
ing, according to evidence documented in Nofsinger and Sias (1999) and Wermers (1999).
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Kim and Wei (1999), among others, also argue that foreign investors in emerging mar-
kets, most of whom are institutional investors, follow feedback strategies similar to their
domestic market behavior. They investigate the behavior of foreign institutional in-
vestors around the Asian crisis using monthly Korean share holdings data and nd that
foreign institutional investors engage in positive feedback trading before, during and
after the crisis and herd signicantly more than their domestic counterpart. Further-
more, they suggest that foreign investors' positive feedback strategies combined with
their herding behavior might have exacerbated or even caused market crashes during
the Asian nancial crisis. Choe, Kho and Stulz (1999) examine trading strategies of
foreign investors on the KSE using transaction-level data and nd no evidence showing
that herding is more important during the crisis. In addition, there appears to be no
clear evidence of positive feedback trading by foreign investors during the crisis, while
before the crisis there is. Their analysis focuses exclusively on equity trading. Given the
signicance of futures trading we complement their analysis by examining herding and
feedback futures market trading for each type of investors.
Herding is trading by a group of investors in the same direction over a certain period
of time (the herding interval).
13
Like Choe, Kho and Stulz (1999), we take the narrow
and simple view of herding that is prevalent in the empirical literature. Namely, we
regard that a group of investors herd if they move together over the span of a single day.
As noted by Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992), herding itself does not necessary
exert a destabilizing eect on the market. If a group of investors with better informa-
tion than others form a herd in buying undervalued stocks and in selling over-valued
stocks, then their herding behavior will stabilize the market by moving prices toward
fundamental values. To examine the importance of herding for each type of investor,
we calculate herding measures for equities (using only KOSPI 200 stocks) and futures
(using nearest month KOSPI 200 futures contracts) following the method proposed by
Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (hereafter LSV). In particular, the herding by group i
on day t is measured as:
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where B
it
/N
it
is the observed ratio of buys to trades by group i on day t and P
it
is the
expected value of the ratio of buys to trades by group i on day t. Since P
it
is a population
quantity, we need to calculate its sample counterpart. As a sample estimate of P
it
for
equities, we use the portion of buys relative to the total transactions by group i for all
stocks traded on day t. As a sample estimate of P
it
for futures, the same ratio with
equities is used to make comparisons with the measures obtained from equities trading.
The rst term in this measure will be larger if the trading by group i is polarized on
either the buy or sell side of the market. The second term is an adjustment factor, which
accounts for the fact that the mean of the rst term is always greater than zero due to
13
Nofsinger and Sias (1999) provide more details about the denition of herding.
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the absolute value. The adjustment factor is computed under the assumption that B
it
follows, in the absence of herding, a binomial distribution with probability P
it
of success.
We compute the herding measure (1) each trading day for equities and futures sep-
arately and take averages before and during the crisis period. Table 5 Panel A reports
herding measures for equities while Table 5 Panel B covers futures. The herding mea-
sures in Table 5 Panel A reect how much each group's trades of KOSPI 200 stocks
is tilted towards either buying or selling. The herding measures for stocks reported
in Table 5 are substantially lower than those nd by Choe et al. Our ndings, which
range between 1 % and 5 % are comparable to the results nd by Wermers (1999) for
herding among mutual funds in the U.S. (except for small stocks). Choe et al. report
measures of at least 20 % for dierent size portfolios. The dierences in results are due
to two reasons: (a) we study the entire portfolio of 200 KOSPI stocks, whereas Choe et
al. compute the measure in (1) for individual stocks and report averages and medians
of individual stock herding measures across size-sorted portfolios and (b) the herding
measure (1) is not invariant with respect to portfolio formation.
14
We prefer to report
herding measures for the entire portfolio of the 200 KOSPI stocks in order to make
comparisons with the measures obtained from futures trading.
During the KSE crisis the herding measures for equities increase for Korean individual
and institutional investors, compared to their pre-crash levels, and decline for foreigners.
The changes are strongly statistically signicant. Note that the direction of herding
measure changes obtained for the 200 KOSPI stocks also dier from those of Choe, Kho
and Stulz (1999), since they nd no evidence showing that herding is more important
during the crisis. The herding measures reported in Table 5 Panel B indicate how much
each group's trades for nearest month futures contracts compare to its trading activity for
all stocks. The magnitude of the herding measures for futures are much larger compared
to the results in Panel A for equities. Herding among foreigners is strongest and even
increases during the crisis. Only the herding of Korean individuals, which is the weakest,
remains the same during the crisis. The t statistics in the last column of Table 5 reveal,
that the movements are statistically signicant except for the minor decline of herding
in the futures market among Korean individuals.
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It is also interesting to note that for
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An illustrative example may show this. Consider a portfolio of two stocks and assume the expected
ratio of buys to trades by a group of investors to be 0:5. Furthermore let the observed ratio Buy/Trade
for the rst stock be 9=10 and for the second stock be 1=10. A portfolio of both stocks has therefore
a Buy/Trade ratio of 10=20. It is easy to show that the averaged herding measures of two individual
stocks is 0.3961, whereas the herding measure for the portfolio is zero. It should also be noted that our
measures are not directly comparable with those of Wermers (1999), since he studies quarterly sampling
frequencies.
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It is worth noting at this point that one might have some reservations about the validity of the t
statistics reported in Table 5. As noted by Wylie (1998), the LSV test of herding may be imperfect
for several reasons. Firstly, since H
it
is computed using the sample estimate of P
it
, the mean of H
it
may not be equal to zero. Under such circumstances the standard the Central Limit Theorem is not
applicable and statistical tests are not valid. Secondly, short sale restrictions, which are implicitly ruled
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equities the level of herding before the crisis is roughly the same for Korean institutions
and foreign investors (who are mostly institutions).
Having examine herding measures, we turn our attention now to the analysis of
feedback trading. Theoretical models, along the line of DeLong et al. (1990), show that
the presence of positive feedback traders can make rational speculation destabilize the
security market as against the prediction of market eciency literature. Cutler et al.
(1990) showed that protable speculation can raise the variance of returns relative to
the variance of shocks to fundamental values in the futures market. If positive feedback
traders exist in a market and their trading behavior is expected by rational speculators,
rational speculators will not counter the irrational price movement by positive feedback
traders. Instead, they will hop on the bandwagon and thus will form a herd with positive
feedback traders. Their behavior will drive prices further away from fundamentals and
thus increase the volatility of the market. Balduzzi et al. (1995) investigate the eect
of on asset price dynamics of positive and negative feedback trading using a multi-asset
model in which stocks and bonds are traded by two types of agents: speculators and
feedback traders. They nd positive feedback strategies make stock returns more volatile
while negative feedback strategies decrease the volatility of stock returns. To investigate
whether each group of investors choose positive feedback strategies in both the cash
and futures market, we dene a measure of order imbalance, namely price-setting order
imbalances (PSOI). Trades on the KSE can be divided into two categories: buy price-
setting trades, and sell price-setting trades. A buy (sell) price-setting trade is dened as
a trade where the buy-side (sell-side) comes after the sell-side (buy-side) and thus the
former makes the trade possible. Price-setting trades we can only considered during the
continuous trading periods. This may slightly bias our results as we reported in Table 4
a shift of non-resident traders to the post-closing session during the crisis. The PSOI of
group i (for a stock or futures contract) on day t; denoted PSOI(i; t); is computed as the
price-setting buy volume of i on day t minus the price-setting sell volume on the same
day by the same group of investors normalized by the daily average price-setting volume
for group i (across all assets - equity or futures) during the entire sample period. It
should be noted that the denition PSOI(i; t) diers slightly from the order imbalance
measure used by Choe et al. The numerator is the same, the denominator diers. Choe
et al. normalize by the daily average price-setting volume for group i for each stock,
while we compute the normalization across all assets - equity or futures. We did this
on purpose to accommodate the more erratic behavior of futures trading. Since the
normalization is merely a scaling factor this dierence is inconsequential. A positive
(negative) sign of PSOI(i; t) indicates net buying (selling) pressure of group i on day
t. The magnitude of PSOI(i; t) shows the strength of net buying or selling pressures
compared to an average day during the sample period. In Table 6 we report the means
out in the LSV measure, imply a left truncation in the distribution of B
it
and therefore invalidate the
binomial distributional assumption. Moreover, the distribution of B
it
can be misspecied, even in the
absence of herding.
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of price-setting order imbalances in the cash and futures markets conditional on the sign
of the previous day's market return since this indicates whether a group of investors are
feedback traders. If a group of investors show net buying (selling) pressure following
a positive market return and show net selling (buying) pressure following a negative
market return, then they will be classied as positive (negative) feedback traders. In
addition to the PSOI measure we also report three types of t statistics. Namely, we
test whether there are signicant dierences in the means of PSOI measures across the
major categories of participants in the market (i.e. across i), we also test whether there
were any structural shifts during the stock market crisis and nally we test whether the
means of PSOI measures conditional on the previous day's return dier.
The results in Table 6 clearly indicate that, for the period January-September 1997,
foreign investors are positive feedback traders in both the cash and futures markets. The
PSOI measures have the same sign as the market return on the previous day, hence
foreign traders buy equities or futures contracts following a positive market return and
sell following a negative market return. During the same period, Korean institutions are
sellers of equity irrespective of the previous day's market return and positive feedback
traders in futures while Korean individuals are negative feedback traders in stocks and
sellers in futures regardless of previous day's market return. We also note from Table 6
that the magnitudes of the PSOI measures are much larger for non-resident investors,
particularly on the derivatives market (with one exception, Korean institutions after
a market decline). The t statistics comparing the means across the three classes of
investors are nevertheless mostly insignicant or borderline.
During the crisis, foreign investors are sellers in the stock market regardless of pre-
vious day's market return and negative feedback traders in the futures market. Korean
institutions as a group remain sellers of stocks regardless of the previous day's return
and become negative feedback traders of futures. Korean individuals, as a group, also
become negative feedback traders in the futures market while they become equity buy-
ers irrespective of the market condition. Table 6 also reports t statistics comparing
the means between the pre-crisis and the crisis period. For all types of investors, the
absolute value of the PSOI measures for equities show signicant increases during the
crisis (with one exception). The t statistics for individual investors are 0:28 and 3:17,
respectively for days with positive and negative market returns, which indicates that
during the crash individuals as a group bought equities signicantly more, compared
to the pre-crisis sample, after negative market returns. Meanwhile, Korean institutions
and foreign investors sell signicantly more than before regardless of the market return.
The absolute values of the PSOI measures for futures, however, increase signicantly
only for days with positive futures market returns across all investors. It should paren-
thetically be noted that our results dier from Choe et al. (1999)'s study. They nd
that Korean individuals are positive feedback traders in the stock market both before
and during the crisis.
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Portfolio insurers typically follow positive feedback strategies while index arbitra-
guers follow negative feedback strategies. During the crisis we nd no evidence of such
strategies. In particular, we nd that all investors are negative feedback traders in the
futures market and none of the groups we can identify are involved in equity feedback
trading. This result suggests that we cannot nd evidence of dynamic interactions be-
tween portfolio insurers and index arbitraguers in both the futures and cash market
during the stock market turbulence, at least for the classication of traders we use. In
that respect the KSE crisis is not a carbon-copy of the NYSE 1987 crash.
V. The Price Impact of Foreign Investors on the Mar-
ket
As a last piece of the puzzle we would like to examine the price impact of trades. Thus
far, we only examine the direction of trades either via herding measures or via the PSOI
measure. We know from the results reported in Table 4 that foreign investors had a
tendency to trade more during the post-closing trading session of the equity market,
where trading occurs with less price uncertainty and price impact compared to the
regular trading hour sessions. In this section we focus on the price impact of trades by
non-resident and Korean investors during regular continuous trading hours.
We examine whether trades by non-resident investors had a destabilizing impact on
prices and market returns and compare them with Korean individuals and institutions.
We compute temporary and permanent price impacts of trade for equities and futures,
using the real-time data. Note that we have chosen a slightly dierent approach from
Choe et al. who use two distinct event studies. In the rst they measure abnormal
returns for eleven 5-minute intervals centered around large trades by foreign market
participants. In the second event study they use a coarser daily sampling frequency. To
dene temporary and permanent price impacts associated with a trade, we follow the
conventional denition of price impacts used in the empirical literature.
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A temporary
price impact is dened as the dierence between the price of a trade and the price of a
subsequent trade, i.e., by:  =   ln(P
t+1
=P
t
): A permanent price impact is dened as
the dierence between price before and after a trade, that is, by:  = ln(P
t+1
=P
t 1
): We
calculate the components of price impacts respectively for sell price-setting trades and
buy price-setting trades. Table 7 reports the average temporary and permanent price
impacts, classied by types of trader, before and during the crisis period. The upper
panel of Table 7 pertains to sell price-setting trades, and the lower to buy price-setting
trades. For equities the results pertain to the 200 stocks of the KOSPI index, while for
futures the results pertain to the various active contracts. For Korean institutions and
foreign investors, the average temporary and permanent price impacts are represented as
16
For more details on temporary and permanent price eects, see Keim and Madhavan (1996).
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a percentage of the corresponding measures for Korean individuals. For sell price-setting
trades, we note that Korean institutions and foreign investors have smaller temporary
components and larger permanent components of price impact, compared to Korean
individuals. For the temporary impact, the percentages range between 10 % and 60
%. It is interesting to note that the temporary price impact change signicantly for
Korean individuals and institutions in both cash and futures markets. The temporary
impact of sell price setting trades of foreigners slightly increase in equity markets and
dramatically decrease in the futures markets but neither movements appear statistically
signicant. The evidence for permanent price impacts is far dierent. Here the price
impacts of foreign traders on the futures market dramatically increase, more than double
from 81.75 %, i.e. smaller impact than Korean individuals, before the crisis to 187.50
% during the crisis. This nding is of course important and signicant, since foreigners
were mostly net sellers of contracts, and increased their share of volume, and they also
increased their herding. The permanent impact of futures sell price setting trades by
Korean institutions, also increases during the crisis but the increase is far less dramatic,
from 114 % to 139 %. For equities, the permanent impact of Korean institutions actually
declines slightly while the equity sell price setting trades by foreigners is slightly higher
during the crisis.
For buy price-setting trades, the relative magnitudes of temporary and permanent
price impacts relative to Korean individuals are reversed. The temporary impact of
Korean institutions and foreigners are larger than 100 % and drop in the equity mar-
kets during the crisis, while they increase signicantly in futures market. The relative
permanent impacts of buy price setting trades by foreigners and Korean institutions are
about 60 % in both equities and futures and have a tendency not to change during the
crisis.
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To further examine the determinants of temporary and permanent price impacts, we also estimated
regression models which explain the size of the price impacts, namely:
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) is temporary (permanent) impact of a trade, PINV
i
is the inverse of the trade price, a
proxy for market value, Q
i
is number of shares traded as a percentage of the total number of shares
outstanding, DINS
i
is a dummy for Korean institutions, DFOR
i
is a dummy for foreign investors, and
R
POST
i
is the post-trade return dened as ln(P
t+3
/P
t+2
). We nd, with some exceptions, that all the
parameters have the expected signs. To streamline the exposition we briey summarize the results
for the coecients on DINS
i
and DFOR
i
. We nd that the marginal eect of trades associated with
Korean institutions and foreign investors imply smaller temporary and larger permanent price impacts.
Chow tests to examine whether there exist structural changes in individual parameters reveal important
breaks. The same regression models were applied to futures, with the same variables except Q
i
which is
number of contracts traded as a percentage of the open interest of the nearest month futures contract.
The regression results for futures imply that sell price-setting trades associated with Korean institutions
and foreign investors have smaller temporary and larger permanent price impacts as expected.
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VI. Conclusion
Many papers, including Choe, Kho and Stulz (1999), Kim and Wei (1999), Park and
Song (1999) and Radelet and Sachs (1998), have examined the Korean market as a
representative example of the Asian nancial crisis. The role of derivative securities
is typically, either implicitly or explicitly, overlooked when examining the crisis. In
this paper, we investigated rst the role of trading in index futures during the Korean
crash. We nd that the fraction of futures volume as a percentage of cash volume soared
around the crisis and that selling pressures in the futures market were transmitted to
the cash market causing a decline in cash prices. These phenomena were not observed
prior to the crisis, indicating that index futures trading played a role during the stock
market turbulence in 1997. Given the signicance of futures trading, we complement
Choe, Kho and Stulz (1999)'s analysis examining whether futures trading by either
domestic or foreign investors, or both together, exerted a destabilizing inuence during
the crash. We nd that foreign investors increased their presence in the futures market
and dramatically increase their herding of futures trading. Foreign traders also become
negative feedback traders of futures and the permanent impact of their futures contracts
sales increases substantially during the crisis. We can only conclude that overlooking the
role of futures trading understates the inuence of foreign traders on the Asian nancial
crisis.
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Figure 1: Monthly Average Near-month Futures Volume relative to Underlying Assets
Volume (Futures Volume×100 / Underlying Assets Volume)
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Figure 2: KOSPI 200 Cash Index, Price of Near-month Futures Contracts and the Basis
(a) KOSPI 200 Cash Index and Price of Near-month Futures Contracts
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(b) Basis on the KOSPI 200 Futures contracts
(Price of Near-month Futures Contract - Cash Index)
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Figure 3: The Basis of Futures Contracts as a Percentage of Cash Index
(a) 1987 S&P 500 Near-month Futures Contracts
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(b) 1997 KOSPI 200 Near-month Futures Contracts
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           Figure 4: Monthly Average Share of Foreign Investor’s Buy and Sell Volume
(a) All KOSPI 200 Stocks
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Figure 5: Monthly Average of Net-buy Volume
(a) All KOSPI 200 Stocks
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Figure 6: Intraday Share of Trading Volume for All KOSPI 200 Stocks
(a) Pre-crisis ( Jan.~Sept. 1997) 
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(b) Crisis Period (Oct.~Dec. 1997) 
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Note that TS1 is the morning-session opening batch auction, TS2 (9:30-10:30) and TS3 (10:30-11:30) are
the morning-session continuous trading periods, TS4 the afternoon-session opening batch auction, TS5
(13:00-14:00) and TS6 (14:00-15:00) are the afternoon-session continuous trading periods, TS7 is the
closing batch auction and TS8 (15:15-15:40) is the post-closing trading session.
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Figure 7: Intraday Share of Trading Volume for Near-month KOSPI 200 Futures Contracts
(a) Pre-crisis (Jan.~Sept. 1997)
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(b) Crisis Period (Oct.~Dec. 1997)
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Note that TS1 is the morning-session opening batch auction, TS2 (9:30-10:30) and TS3 (10:30-11:30) are
the morning-session continuous trading periods, TS4 the afternoon-session opening batch auction, TS5
(13:00-14:00) and TS6 (14:00-15:00) are the afternoon-session continuous trading periods, TS7 is the
closing batch auction.
   
29
Table 1
Autocorrelation Tests for the Daily KOSPI 200 Cash and Futures return
    This sample covers daily data from January 3, 1997 until December 26, 1997, which is divided into four
equal sub-periods. The first three belong to pre-crisis era while the last one is the crisis period. The entries
are autocorrelation coefficients and corresponding Box-Pierce statistics for KOSPI 200 cash and futures
returns. A Box-Pierce statistic in excess of its critical value indicates significant autocorrelation. Critical
values for 6 and 12 lags are 10.64 and 18.55 respectively. * indicates statistical significance at the 1 %
level.
Period Cash Index Return Near-month Futures Return
To Autocorrelation Box-Pierce To Autocorrelation Box-Pierce
 
Lag Coefficient Statistic Lag Coefficient Statistic
Jan.~Mar. 1997 1 0.171 1.88 1 0.008 0.00
(Pre-crisis) 2 -0.131 2.99 2 0.037 0.09
3 0.145 4.37 3 0.146 1.51
 6 -0.179 13.92* 6 -0.154 5.87
 12 -0.051 17.78 12 0.074 13.35
April~June 1997 1 0.129 1.07 1 0.014 0.01 
(Pre-crisis)  2 0.070  1.38 2 0.122  0.10
3 0.082  1.82 3 0.096  1.60
 6 -0.091  6.77 6 -0.181  8.90
 12 0.100  17.36 12 0.061 13.70 
July~Sept. 1997 1 0.184 2.16 1 0.265 4.51 
(Pre-crisis)  2 0.001  2.16 2 0.012  4.52
3 0.094  2.75 3 -0.051  4.69
 6 0.008  5.61 6 -0.044  10.51
 12 0.049  12.10 12 0.187  15.94
Oct.~Dec. 1997 1 0.080 0.41 1 0.164 1.70 
 (Crisis Period) 2 -0.214  3.34 2 -0.162  3.38
3 -0.134  4.52 3 -0.234  6.94
 6 0.001  9.90 6 -0.007  15.15*
 12  -0.175  14.96 12  -0.155  27.51*
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Table 2
Granger Causality Tests for the Daily KOSPI 200 Cash and Futures Return
  Entries to the table represent results of Granger Causality tests between futures and cash returns (denoted by FRE
and CRE respectively), futures returns and cash order imbalances (denoted by COI), futures order imbalances
(denoted by FOI) and cash returns, and futures order imbalances and cash order imbalances.  Entries in the tables are
lag lengths and F-statistics for each causality test. The lag length was selected using the Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC). * indicates statistical significance at the 5 % level.
Jan.~Mar. ’97 April~June ’97 July~Sept. ’97 Oct.~Dec. ’97Null hypothesis
Lags F-statistic Lags F-statistic Lags F-statistic Lags F-statistic
FRE does not G. C. CRE 6 1.71 4 3.24* 2 3.64* 4 3.19*
CRE does not G. C. FRE 3.57* 2.07 0.37 1.72
FRE does not G. C. COI 6 0.53 4 0.10 6 1.26 6 3.20*
COI does not G. C. FRE 3.24 0.84 0.31 1.36
FOI does not G. C. CRE 5 2.21 2 1.00 2 1.05 5 3.91*
CRE does not G. C. FOI 1.85 0.63 0.08 0.26
FOI does not G. C. COI 6 0.12 2 0.05 6 1.41 4 4.91*
COI does not G. C. FOI 0.47 1.50 0.41 1.21
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Table 3
Foreign Ownership Limit in Korea
  Entries to the tables are the individual and aggregate foreign ownership restrictions for KSE-listed stocks and
derivatives. Individual restrictions apply to investment holdings of individual foreign investors, while aggregate
restrictions apply to the total investment holdings of all foreign investors for a particular stock or derivatives contract.
According to the restrictions, both individual and aggregate foreign investment in stocks (derivatives) cannot exceed a
certain percentage of the total outstanding shares of each company (average daily open interest for the last three
months).
Oct.
’96
Nov.
’96
May
’97
June
’97
July
’97
Nov.
’97
Dec.
’97
May
’98
Equities
KSE-listed stocks Individual
Aggregate
  5%
20%
  5%
20%
  6%
23%
  6%
23%
  6%
23%
  7%
26%
50%
50%
100%
100%
Derivatives
KOSPI200 futures
KOSPI200 options
Individual
Aggregate
Individual
Aggregate
  3%
15%
  5%
30%
  5%
30%
  5%
30%
  5%
30%
   5%
100%
   5%
100%
   5%
100%
   5%
100%
   5%
100%
   5%
100%
100%
100%
 100%
100%
Table 4
Descriptive Statistics of Intraday Shares of Trading Volume
  Entries to the table are the mean, median and standard deviation for the daily share of trading volume by category of trader.  The sample period is divided into
two sub-samples: before the crisis (January-September 1997) and during the crisis (October-December 1997).  The KSE trading day is divided into eight time
slots.  They are defined as follows: TS1 (the morning session opening batch auction), TS2 (9:30~10:30), TS3 (10:30~11:30), TS4 (the afternoon session opening
batch auction), TS5 (13:00~14:00), TS6 (14:00~15:00), TS7 (the closing batch auction) and TS8 (the post-closing trading session).  Note that TS2, TS3, TS5 and
TS6 are continuous trading periods while the others are not. The post-closing session only applies to equities. The t-statistic before and during the crisis period
tests the null hypothesis of equal means. * indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.
TS1 TS2 TS3 TS4 TS5 TS6 TS7 TS8
Before During Before During Before During Before During Before During Before During Before During Before During
A. All KOSPI 200 stocks
Korean Mean 75.0 77.0 68.1 76.6 65.6 73.3 73.6 75.6 63.3 69.7 63.6 70.4 60.3 62.0 65.0 53.6
Individuals Median 79.5 80.9 68.9 77.2 66.5 73.9 74.6 76.6 64.2 69.3 64.9 69.2 60.9 62.3 76.2 53.6
Stdev 17.0 14.4 7.3 6.0 6.7 6.6 9.4 9.3 6.8 7.3 6.7 7.7 8.0 9.8 31.9 25.3
(t-test) 0.8 8.2* 7.8* 1.4 6.2* 6.6* 1.4 -2.5*
Korean Mean 15.9 11.3 21.6 13.5 22.9 14.8 14.9 11.9 23.5 16.3 23.4 16.3 24.4 20.5 19.7 18.3
Institutions Median 11.9 9.1 20.6 13.2 22.3 14.2 12.6 9.4 22.9 15.6 22.7 15.9 22.6 19.1 4.7 11.9
Stdev 14.3 8.6 5.4 3.3 5.5 3.4 8.3 7.6 5.0 4.3 5.0 3.4 7.1 7.7 26.5 19.0
(t-test) -2.4* -11.0* -11.0* -2.5* -10.0* -10.2* -3.6* -0.4
Foreign Mean 9.1 11.8 10.3 9.9 11.4 11.9 11.5 12.5 13.2 14.0 13.0 13.3 15.3 17.5 15.3 28.1
Investors Median 6.8 8.4 9.4 9.7 10.7 12.6 10.2 11.4 12.4 14.1 12.5 13.8 14.7 17.8 6.9 28.1
Stdev 8.9 10.9 4.7 4.8 4.9 5.2 7.1 7.3 4.9 5.8 4.7 6.2 5.6 8.3 19.6 19.6
(t-test) 1.9 -0.6 0.7 0.9 1.0 0.4 2.3* 4.4*
B. Near-month KOSPI 200 Futures Contract
Korean Mean 31.4 52.5 26.7 49.7 23.7 49.1 27.3 54.9 23.2 48.8 24.4 56.9 23.1 53.7
Individuals Median 28.7 47.0 26.8 48.0 23.0 48.7 22.0 57.2 22.5 46.3 23.1 18.8 20.5 22.0
Stdev 18.9 21.2 7.3 11.7 7.6 14.2 21.4 24.8 8.5 14.8 7.2 54.0 12.1 50.0
(t-test) 7.3* 18.0* 17.7* 8.3* 16.5* 7.9* 7.6*
Korean Mean 59.3 40.8 69.8 44.1 73.5 45.5 66.4 40.0 73.6 44.6 72.6 37.8 65.0 32.2
Institutions Median 62.4 40.9 69.7 46.2 74.5 47.2 70.9 40.9 74.8 47.5 73.9 38.9 66.0 33.0
Stdev 19.6 21.8 7.5 13.0 7.8 17.0 23.5 25.7 9.0 17.8 7.4 19.8 13.3 19.9
(t-test) -6.2* -18.8* -17.4* -7.4* -16.5* -19.9* -14.5*
Foreign Mean 9.3 6.7 3.5 6.2 2.8 5.4 6.3 5.1 3.2 6.6 3.1 5.3 11.9 14.1
Investors Median 4.4 4.1 2.8 4.0 2.6 4.4 0.0 1.1 2.5 3.9 2.4 2.8 9.8 9.5
Stdev 12.1 7.2 2.7 7.4 2.2 7.0 12.5 9.4 2.8 8.5 2.4 9.9 10.4 16.0
(t-test) -1.6 4.2* 4.4* -0.7 4.7* 2.8* 1.2
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Table 5
Herding Measures (in Percent) for Equities and Futures
  Herding measures for equities (using by all KOSPI 200 stocks) and futures (using by near- month
KOSPI 200 futures contracts) following the method proposed by Lakonishok et al. (1992) are
reported. The herding by group i on day t is measured as follows:
Hit =Bit  / Nit  – Pit − E[Bit  / Nit  – Pit ]
where Bit  / Nit is the observed ratio of buys to trades by group i on day t and Pit is the expected
value of the ratio. The sample estimate of Pit  for equities was computed as the ratio of buys to the
total transactions by group i for all stocks traded on day t. As the sample estimate of Pit for futures,
the same ratio with equities is used to make comparisons with equities. The herding measures of
each group of investors are computed every day respectively for equities and futures and averaged
across days before (January-September 1997) and during (October-December 1997) the crisis
period. t-statistics for the differences in means (assuming unequal variances) before and during the
crisis period are also provided. * indicates statistical significance at the 5 % level.
Pre-crisis
(Jan.-Sept.’97)
Crisis period
(Oct.-Dec.’97)
t-test for
mean difference
A.  All KOSPI 200 Stocks
Korean individuals
Korean institutions
Foreign investors
  1.2118
  3.9245
  3.4635
  1.8913
  4.7109
  1.4756
  ( 3.20)*
( 1.83)
  (-8.23)*
B.  Near-month KOSPI 200 Futures Contracts
Korean individuals
Korean institutions
Foreign investors
  3.8209
  6.4441
16.1616
  3.1406
13.8824
25.8105
(-1.39)
  ( 4.08)*
  ( 3.98)*
Table 6
Price-setting Order Imbalances for Equities and Futures
  Entries to the tables are price-setting order imbalances for each group of investors. The daily price-setting order imbalances for a group of investors, PSOI(i,t) are
computed as their buy price-setting volume minus sell price-setting volume normalized by their average daily price-setting volume across the entire sample period. The
figures represent average price-setting order imbalances conditional on the sign of cash or futures returns of the previous trading day. A group of investors are regarded as
positive (negative) feedback traders in either stock or futures market, if they show net buying (selling) pressure following a positive market return and show net selling
(buying) pressure following a negative market return. * indicates statistical significance at the 5% level. 1) t-test for mean differences between the days with positive market
returns and the days with negative market returns. 2) t-test for mean differences between two types of investors.
All KOSPI 200 Stocks Near-month KOSPI 200 Futures ContractsConditional on the sign of
cash or futures return
of the previous day
Korean
Individuals
(1)
Korean
Institutions
(2)
Foreign
Investors
(3)
t-test of 2)
(3)-(1)
t-test of 2)
(3)-(2)
Korean
Individuals
(1)
Korean
Institutions
(2)
Foreign
Investors
(3)
t-test of 2)
(3)-(1)
t-test of 2)
(3)-(2)
Pre-crisis(Jan.-Sept. ’97)
Rt-1 > 0
      < 0
t-test for mean differences1)
-0.102
0.888
   ( 0.72)
-0.805
-9.587
   (-2.43)*
5.456
-7.565
   (-3.02)*
   ( 1.62)
   ( 2.84)*
   ( 1.58)
   ( 0.51)
-0.138
-1.428
   (-1.00)
 1.398
-0.999
   (-1.84)
6.435
-8.412
(-3.10)*
   ( 1.89)
   (-1.99)*
   ( 1.48)
   (-2.06)*
Crisis Period(Oct.-Dec.’97)
Rt-1 > 0      
      < 0      
t-test for mean differences 1)
1.059
13.161
   ( 1.32)
-44.918
-26.777
   ( 0.96)
-64.823
-47.878
   ( 0.98)
   (-4.10)*
   (-5.16)*
   (-0.83)
   (-1.59)
-12.582
   8.533
   ( 1.88)
-8.348
 2.943
   ( 2.41)*
-27.251
 20.334
( 1.16)
   (-0.47)
   ( 0.42)
   (-0.61)
   ( 0.65)
t-test for Mean Differences
Between the Two Periods
Rt-1 > 0
      < 0
   ( 0.28)
   ( 3.17)*
   (-4.02)*
   (-2.51)*
   (-7.18)*
   (-5.17)*
   (-3.95)*
   ( 1.74)
   (-5.44)*
   ( 1.36)
   (-2.01)*
   ( 1.62)
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Table 7
Temporary and Permanent Price Impacts of trade for Equities and Futures
  Temporary and permanent price impacts of trade for equities (all KOSPI 200 stocks) and futures (near-month futures contracts) , using the real-time data. Temporary price
impacts (τ) and permanent price impacts (pi) are defined as follows: τ = - ln(Pt+1/Pt), pi = ln(Pt+1/Pt-1). Each trade is classified into two types: sell price-setting trades and buy
price-setting trades.  For each type of trade executed by Korean individuals, temporary and permanent price impacts are computed each day and averaged across days before
(January-September 1997) and during (October-December 1997) the crisis. The temporary and permanent price impacts of Korean ins titutions and foreign investors are
represented as percentages of the corresponding Korean individuals’ entries.  t-tests for the differences in means are also reported.  Note that all t-tests were performed on raw
price impacts. * indicates statistical significance at the 5 % level. 1) t-test for mean differences between the pre-crisis and crisis period. 2) t-test for mean differences between
two types of investors.
A. Temporary Price impacts (τ) B. Permanent Price impacts (pi)
Korean
Individuals
(1)
Korean
Institutions
(2)
Foreign
Investors
(3)
t-test of 2)
(3)-(1)
t-test of 2)
(3)-(2)
Korean
Individuals
(1)
Korean
Institutions
(2)
Foreign
Investors
(3)
t-test of 2)
(3)-(1)
t-test of 2)
(3)-(2)
Sell Price-setting Trades
Pre-crisis             Equities
                            Futures
Crisis Period       Equities
                            Futures
t-test 1)                 Equities
                            Futures
-0.00049
-0.00012
-0.00045
-0.00027
-11.41*
 17.90*
  9.37%
25.32%
28.37%
27.79%
 7.98*
 8.04*
11.19%
57.47%
15.74%
25.07%
 1.43
-0.12
-54.63*
   -3.01*
-13.20*
  -8.70*
 0.98
  2.36*
-22.22*
-0.43
-0.00058
-0.00008
-0.00082
-0.00014
45.84*
  5.83*
168.92%
 147.18%
114.01%
 139.40%
  -2.75*
 10.26*
123.46%
 144.46%
   81.75%
 187.50%
   -2.83*
    3.74*
30.79*
       1.56
 -9.33*
  4.36*
 -4.24*
-0.10
-14.95*
 3.03*
Buy Price-setting Trades
Pre-crisis             Equities
                            Futures
Crisis Period        Equities
                            Futures
t-test 1)                 Equities
                            Futures
0.00040
0.00006
0.00044
0.00013
  9.38*
10.23*
192.10%
102.09%
179.80%
210.74%
   1.67
  29.86*
140.79%
107.71%
134.26%
155.54%
    2.37*
    3.93*
21.12*
0.25
26.27*
  3.42*
-21.47*
 0.18
 -6.31*
 -3.27*
0.00073
0.00012
0.00083
0.00018
17.17*
 6.09*
 53.99%
 87.23%
 55.27%
 67.37%
   3.60*
 1.35
 64.06%
101.05%
 59.61%
  58.61%
   1.72
  -0.46
-10.80*
  0.06
-18.28*
  -2.65*
10.29*
 0.71
 1.51
-0.55
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